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The economic approach to cities relies on a spatial equilibrium for workers, employers and builders.
The worker's equilibrium implies that positive attributes in one location, like access to downtown
or high wages, are offset by negative attributes, like high housing prices.   The employer's equilibrium
requires that high wages be offset by a high level of productivity, perhaps due to easy access to customers
or suppliers.  The search for the sources of productivity differences that can justify high wages is the
basis for the study of agglomeration economies which has been a significant branch of urban economics
in the past 20 years.  The builder's equilibrium condition pushes us to understand the causes of supply
differences across space that can explain why some places have abundant construction and low prices
while others have little construction and high prices.  Since the economic theory of cities emphasizes
a search for exogenous causes of endogenous outcomes like local wages, housing prices and city growth,
it is unsurprising that the economic empirics on cities have increasingly focused on the quest for exogenous
sources of variation.  The economic approach to urban policy emphasizes the need to focus on people,
rather than places, as the ultimate objects of policy concern and the need for policy to anticipate the










I.  Introduction  
 
Why are some cities so much more productive than others?  What are the environmental 
and social costs of density?  Why are there ghettos?  How does living close to others 
change us? Why do cities rise and fall?  Why is housing so expensive in some places? 
Urban economics addresses all of these disparate questions and all of them can be seen as 
components of urban economics’ great puzzle: why do so many people cluster next to 
each other in cities? That question is itself one part of the even grander quest of economic 
geography to understand all of the location decisions of people and firms.    
 
The economic approach to understanding location choices, like living in cities, focuses on 
understanding the motives might underlie those choices.  Are places attracting people by 
offering high wages or cheap housing or good weather?  Why do firms stay in places 
where they must pay high wages?  Since urban development reflects millions of 
individual choices to live in cities, understanding that development requires us both to 
understand the relative importance of the different urban attributes and to understand why 
cities have those attributes.  For example, high wages certainly help attract people to New 
York City.  However, for us to understand the eight million people who choose to live in 
that city, we would also need to understand why its wages were so high.  The sub-
discipline of agglomeration economics has developed to understand the productivity 
differences that presumably lie behind the observed income differences across space.      
 
This essay explores the key elements of the economic approach to cities and how they 
reflect the core elements of my discipline.  Economics has three great pillars, two of 
which help us to understand the world and one of which helps us to offer policy advice.  
The first pillar of economics is that people respond to incentives.  This assumption is 
caricatured by some who suggest that economists think that people only respond to 
financial incentives, which is surely false.  Still, it is true that the incentive principle leads 
economists to look at the financial incentives that might explain location choices.   
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The second pillar of economics is our concept of a no arbitrage equilibrium.  Adam Smith 
used an early version of the no arbitrage equilibrium to make sense of wages; Milton 
Friedman popularized the concept with the phrase “there is no such thing as a free 
lunch.”
1  This pillar enables us to not only examine individual decision, but also to make 
predictions about how an entire system will look.   
 
In urban economics, there are three key no arbitrage relationships.  First, individuals must 
be indifferent across space, which has been taken to mean that the flow of wages plus 
amenities minus housing costs is roughly equal in every location.  Second, firms must be 
indifferent over space and over hiring new workers.  This condition implies that 
differences in wages must be offset by differences in productivity.  Third, builders must 
be indifferent about building or not building new units.  This condition implies that 
housing prices cannot rise too far above the total costs of construction, as long as those 
costs are understood to include physical building costs, the price of land and the 
difficulties involved in dealing with land use regulations.   
 
Economics’ third pillar is the assumption that good policies increase the range of choices 
that an individual can make.  Economists’ enthusiasm for income is driven by the view 
that more wealth gives people more choices.  Our enthusiasm for political freedom has 
the same source.   Economists talk about good policies increasing “utility levels” which is 
often misunderstood as suggesting that these policies will make people happier.  
Happiness is an important emotion, but there is no sense in which it is particularly related 
to economists’ definition of utility.  Formally, higher level of utility is equivalent to 
having more options, not wearing a smile.   
 
These three pillars have shaped the economic approach to cities.  In Section II of this 
essay, I discuss the central theoretical construct of economic geography and urban 
economics: the spatial equilibrium.   The power of the spatial equilibrium assumption is 
that it predicts that if something is particularly good in one location, then we should 
                                                 
1 Robert Heinlein is usually given as the original source of the phrase, although there do appear to be earlier 
antecedents.   4 
 
expect to see something bad offsetting it.  In the intra-urban Alonso-Muth-Mills model, 
high prices close to the city center are offset by short commutes.  In the inter-urban 
Rosen-Roback model, high incomes are offset by either high prices or disamenities.  The 
spatial equilibrium assumption has been particularly effective in making sense of urban 
housing markets.   
 
In Section III, I turn to the equilibrium condition for employers and builders.  The firms’ 
equilibrium condition leads us to explain the differences in incomes across space by 
understanding why productivity levels would differ across space.   Productivity levels 
might be higher because of access to natural resources like productive land or rivers or 
because of increased ease of transportation to suppliers or customers.  The builders’ 
equilibrium condition means that to understand differences in housing costs across 
growing areas, we must understand why it costs more to build in some areas than in 
others.     
 
Section IV turns to the empirical approaches favored by urban economists.  Economics’ 
theoretical definition of a city differs significantly from the empirical implementation of 
that definition.  Conceptually, cities are the absence of physical space between people 
and firms.  Cities are density or proximity, perhaps combined with sufficient scale.  
Empirically, cities are either the formal and somewhat arbitrary political units that bear 
that name or the name “metropolitan areas,” which are themselves somewhat arbitrary 
combinations of counties, which are also arbitrary political units.   While one might 
wonder about the mismatch between concept and data, economics is a pragmatic 
discipline that has generally happily used the imperfect available data.   
 
The empirical methods used by urban economics are driven by the attachment of urban 
economists toeconomic theory.  This attachment has produced two different styles of 
empirical research.  One style of structural empirical research focuses on using data to 
estimate formal models.  A second style of research emphasizes exogenous sources of 
variation, or instruments, such as rivers or sharp political boundaries.  The importance 
that economists place on exogenous sources of variation comes from a core disciplinary 5 
 
view that our theoretical models are meant to map connections between exogenous 
variables and outcomes.   
 
Finally, in Section V, I turn to the economic approach to urban policy-making.  The core 
insight of the field is the primacy of person over place.  Economics judges policies by 
whether they increase the choices available to people, not on whether they help rebuild a 
particular locale.  Economics does not preclude place-based policies, such as urban 
redevelopment, if they are the best way to help people, but economists do insist that these 
policies be judged on whether they improve individual’s lives, not on whether they make 
a place more pleasant.   
 
Beyond putting people first, urban economics has two other themes that run through its 
policy prescriptions.  First, urban economics has often assumed that governments only 
imperfectly represent their constituencies.  As a result, individual economists have 
offered favored institutions that might increase competition across governments and 
mitigate this problem.  Second, since urban economics starts with the mobility decisions 
of people and firms, urban economists tend to argue that policies need to be designed not 
just on the basis of current location patterns but also with an understanding of how new 
policies will alter individual location choices.   
 
II.  The Spatial Equilibrium Approach 
 
The theoretical centerpiece of urban economics is the concept of a spatial equilibrium 
which assumes that there are no free lunches to be gained by changing location.  While 
this assumption is often treated with more general utility functions, economists often 
assume a linear utility function, which then implies that the elements of utility that are 
related to location choice are captured by: 
 
(1)  Income + Amenities – Housing Costs – Transportation Costs. 
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The spatial equilibrium assumption is that this flow is constant over space.   While this 
assumption is obviously a simplification, it has had a remarkable ability to generate 
hypotheses that have been in accord with the evidence.  Within metropolitan areas, the 
Alonso-Muth Mills model assumes that income is constant and looks at whether high 
housing costs are offset by low amenities or low transport costs.  Across metropolitan 
areas, the Rosen-Roback model looks at the tradeoff between income, amenities and 
housing costs.   
 
The spatial equilibrium approach is often augmented in different ways.  For example, 
information about transportation costs and technologies can yield sharp predictions about 
how housing prices will change with distance from the city center.  When there are 
different types of people, these models can predict where different people will live.  The 
incorporation of housing supply into the model enables these equations to predict density 
levels within a city and population patterns across cities.   
 
The Alonso-Muth-Mills Model 
 
The most significant piece of urban economic theory remains the spatial equilibrium 
model of William Alonso (1964), which was extended by Mills (1967) and Muth (1969).  
Alonso’s model looks within a metropolitan area and assumes that both income and 
amenities are constant.  These assumptions then imply that housing costs plus transport 
costs are constant across space, which means that housing costs will decline as transport 
costs rise with distance to the city center.  In the simplest case, where everyone works at 
the center of the city and transport costs rise linearly with distance to that center, i.e. if 
costs equal “t” times distance, then housing costs must equal costs at the center minus “t” 
times distance.   
 
The model is simple, elegant and contains a far amount of truth.  Figure 1 shows the 
relationship between median housing prices across 187 cities in the greater Boston region 
and distance between those cities and downtown Boston.
2  On average, an extra mile 
                                                 
2 Housing prices are based on the 2000 Census.  Distance to Boston is defined in Glaeser and Ward (2006).   7 
 
from the city center is associated with housing prices dropping by $1100.   If an $1,100 
drop in price is roughly associated with a $110 increase in annual cost, then the Alsonso-
Muth-Mills model suggests that an extra mile of distance is associated with added travel 
costs of two dollars per week, which seems low but not implausible since so many people 
are not commuting into the city center. 
 
The relationship is far from perfect.  Distance explains only 15 percent of the 
heterogeneity in prices among those towns.  Other factors, including housing quality and 
both exogenous and man-made amenities, differ across towns.  Such amenities, like 
school quality, are often far more important in determining housing prices than proximity 
to downtown.  Still, the model has made a prediction that is certainly not rejected by the 
data.  Thousands of variants of this regression have been run by economists since 
Alonso’s model was first published, and almost all of them have found this general 
pattern.   
 
In some cases, economists have found a convex, rather than a linear relationship between 
distance and price, where housing prices drop steeply with distance over some initial 
distance and the relationship between prices and distance flattens out.  A slight variant on 
the basic model can explain this pattern.  Assume that individuals have access to two 
different transportation technologies, such as walking and driving.  One technology 
involves no fixed costs, but imposes a cost of t  times distance.  The other technology 
involves a fixed cost, like having to buy a car, but imposes a lower cost of t times 
distance.   
 
Optimal use of these technologies implies that the technology without fixed costs 
(perhaps walking) should be used until a point where  t t −  times distance equals the fixed 
cost.  People should be willing to pay the fixed cost only when the time savings from 
driving is big enough to pay for that fixed cost.  Even if this calculation is a 
simplification, there is little doubt that car usage gets much higher further away from city 
centers (Glaeser, Kahn and Rappaport, 2007).  This simple change to the model predicts 8 
 
that housing costs will decline by t  times distance in areas that are close to the city and 
decline by t times distance in areas that are further away from the city.  The slope of 
prices on distance should therefore flatten out as distance from the city increases, which 
delivers the convex relationship seen in the data.   
 
Alternatively, the cost of commuting “t” per unit distance might be a function of 
investment in technologies, like owning a bike or car, that reduces the price of 
commuting per unit distance.  If we let k(t) denote cost of investing in these technologies 
where k(t) is continuously differentiable, k’(t)<0 and k”(t)>0, then cost minimization 
requires minimizing k(t)+t*distance.  The first order condition is that -k’(t)=distance and 
the cost of commuting per unit distance falls with commute distance.  People who live 
further away invest in better technology and this also implies the convex relationship that 
often appears in the data.  Sensible use of transportation technologies implies that slower 
technologies will be used closer to the city center, which in turn implies that the 
relationship between prices and distance will be higher close to the center.   
 
A second important permutation to the model allows densities to respond to demand.  
This change allows the model to speak not only to prices, but also to the degree of 
development at different locations.  The model can be adapted either by making land 
consumption flexible so that people consume less land where it is expensive and close to 
the city.  Alternatively, we can assume that living space is manufactured with land and 
physical capital.  As land gets more expensive, builders use more capital and build up.  
High densities close to the city center can be seen as an application of the incentive 
principle, because a greater willingness to pay for living area that is valuable because of 
its proximity then induces a greater supply of living area per unit of land.  Either version 
of the model predicts that densities will be higher closer to the city center. 
 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the logarithm of people per square mile and 
distance to Boston across the same 187 cities and towns.  Again, there is a robust positive 
relationship and distance explains 45 percent of the variation in density levels across 
those cities and towns.  For each extra mile of distance from Boston, the predicted 9 
 
density level drops by .08 log points or about eight percent.  Again, the predictions of the 
simple model are supported by the data.   
 
The attraction of the Alonso-Muth-Mills model to economists illustrates a central point 
about economics that differentiates it from other fields.  The model’s strength lies in its 
ability to make predictions that hold generally, not in its ability to explain the exact 
peculiarities of particular places.  While some disciplines place great value in adding 
complexity and nuance, economists like the ability to produce general rules that hold 
most of the time.  Economists are usually more interested in common patterns than in 
particular idiosyncrasies.   
 
One objection to the Alonso-Muth-Mills model is that it is increasingly at odds with a 
world that is no longer monocentric.  In most cities, employment is located far away from 
the old city center (Glaeser and Kahn, 2001).  But even this can be incorporated into the 
Alonso-Muth-Mills, framework.  For example, Henderson and Mitra (1994) extend this 
model to include multiple employment centers.  One general prediction of these 
extensions is that in cities where employment is more decentralized, the relationship 
between distance from the city and housing prices will be flatter.  Glaeser and Kahn 
(2001) find exactly that.  The tendency of prices to fall with distance to the center is 
much higher in those areas with centralized employment, which can be seen as support 
for using this type of model to explain differences in price patterns across cities.   
 
The application of the spatial equilibrium concept in the Alonso-Muth-Mills model is 
useful not only in predicting housing prices and density levels, but also in predicting the 
locations of different population groups.  In particular, the model has been particularly 
effective at looking at the location decisions of the rich and the poor.  One of the most 
striking facts about American cities is that poverty rates are much higher in city centers 
than on the outskirts of town. This poverty does not mean that central cities make people 
poor, but rather that city centers attract the poor (Glaeser, Kahn and Rappaport, 2007). 
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This fact may seem initially to be a puzzle for the Alonso-Muth-Mills framework.  
Usually, we think that travel costs are higher for the rich than they are for the poor, 
because the rich have a higher opportunity cost of time since their wages are higher.  
After all, lost time is often the most important element in commuting costs.  Economics 
suggest that someone who earns 20 dollars an hour should be willing to pay more to 
avoid an hour of commuting than someone who earns 10 dollars an hour.  This logic 
suggests that the rich should pay more for low commuting costs at the city center, yet 
they generally are not the high bidders for land close to the urban core.   
 
There are two explanations for this phenomenon.  One is given by Becker (1965) who 
argues that the greater value of time for the rich can be offset if the rich also want to own 
more land.  The greater desire for land pushes the rich to live where land is cheap, on the 
edge of the city, just as a greater desire for warmth pushes sun-lovers to move south.  
While this hypothesis is theoretically elegant, the desire of the rich to own more land 
does not seem to be great enough to justify their decisions to live on the urban edge.   
 
An alternative view is that the rich and the poor use different transportation technologies 
(LeRoy and Sonstelie, 1983).  If the rich drive and the poor take public transportation, 
then the rich can have lower costs of commuting per mile even if their time is worth 
more.  Glaeser, Kahn and Rappaport (2007) find that access to public transportation does 
seem to explain the decisions of the poor to live in urban centers.  Indeed, poverty rates 
even seem to rise in areas that are close to new subway stops.   The connection between 
public transportation and poverty is not a problem, but rather a reflection of the valuable 
role that public transportation plays in serving and attracting the poor.   
 
The Rosen-Roback Model 
 
While the Alonso-Muth-Mills model is the core tool for understanding prices and density 
levels within metropolitan areas, the Rosen-Roback model is economics’ core tool for 
understanding prices across metropolitan areas.  The Rosen-Roback model is more 
complex than the Alonso-Muth-Mills model in that it allows income and amenities to 11 
 
differ across space.  The Rosen-Roback model compensates for this added complexity by 
treating the metropolitan area as a single homogeneous entity, so that everyone in the 
area is assumed to have the same housing costs, transport costs and amenity levels.   
 
The core prediction of a spatial equilibrium across metropolitan areas is that high housing 
prices must reflect either high income or high amenities or both.  People wouldn’t be 
willing to pay for nice places if they weren’t getting something for their money.  Rosen 
(1979) presents the core theory that emphasizes that the price of amenities across space 
requires us to look at both wages and prices.   Roback (1982) took this model to the data 
and found that people did take home less money, net of housing costs, in places with 
more amenities.  Gyourko and Tracy (1991) expanded the set of studied amenities and 
focused on the willingness to pay for different types of government. 
 
Figure 3 shows the basic empirical value of this approach by graphing housing costs on 
incomes across metropolitan areas.  Forty percent of the variation in metropolitan area 
prices is associated with differences in income.  On average, a one thousand dollar 
increase in income is associated with a $3,700 increase in housing values.  While the 
strong association supports the model, the coefficient seems low.  After all, a $3,700 
increase in housing values suggests an increase in annual costs of no more than $400, 
given reasonable assumptions on interest rates, maintenance levels and local taxes.  If it 
really only cost $400 dollars more to move into an area with $1,000 higher income levels, 
then people should flock to those high income, high cost areas.   
 
There are at least two good explanations for why this relationship is still compatible with 
the Rosen-Roback model, but these explanations make it clear that the model’s 
predictions are a little fuzzy.  First, differences in income are not fully correcting for 
differences in human capital.  It isn’t clear that someone who moves to an area that we 
think has $1000 more income per year will actually earn that extra income, because the 
people in that high income area may also have higher skills.  Second, high income places 
may also have unattractive amenities, like long commutes, that offset the higher income 
levels.   12 
 
 
A second way to use the spatial equilibrium assumption is to work directly with incomes 
that correct for local prices.  The American Chamber of Commerce Research Association 
(ACCRA) has created a set of these indices for a subset of metropolitan areas.  Using 
these indices, we can look at real income levels which allegedly correct for housing price 
differences across the U.S.  Perhaps the most natural amenity to investigate is warmth, 
and Figure 4 shows the relationship between real incomes and median January 
temperature across metropolitan areas.   
 
Across the sample of approximately 200 metropolitan areas, median January temperature 
explores 23 percent of the variation.  As January temperature rises by 10 degrees, real 
income drops by 720 dollars.  People do seem willing to require higher real income to 
live in places that are colder, which certainly does support the idea that places with higher 
real income levels are worse in other dimensions, just as the spatial equilibrium 
assumption predicts.   
 
Another negative amenity is long commutes.  Figure 5 shows the relationship between 
income and commute times across a sample of approximately 230 cities with populations 
of 100,000 or more.  In this case, I am looking at purely nominal income levels and 
median commutes.  As income increases by 10,000 dollars, median commute time 
increases by 1.5 minutes. This relationship confirms the view that high income places 
also have other negative amenities which offset high financial returns.   
 
Hedonic Pricing and Housing Supply 
 
The spatial equilibrium assumption holds out the possibility that housing prices can be 
used to accurately assess people’s willingness to pay for location-specific amenities.  If a 
particular amenity is always associated with a 500 dollar increase in housing costs, 
holding income and everything else constant, then it might be reasonable to infer that 
people place a value of 500 dollars on that amenity.  In many cases—like crime and 
school quality—there may not be an independent way of assessing the value placed on an 13 
 
amenity, so that hedonic pricing models offer the only hope of figuring out the value that 
people place on a particular public service.  Since economists would like to weigh costs 
and benefits when they determine the optimal amount of public investment in these 
amenities, hedonic pricing models offer the hope of delivering an assessment of the 
public benefits associated with some forms of publicly provided goods.   
 
A healthy body of research on housing price hedonics has emphasized at least two major 
issues with this type of analysis.  First, on a purely conceptual level, housing prices can 
only tell us about the willingness to pay of the marginal resident in a particular area.  This 
marginal resident’s willingness to pay may not represent the average willingness to pay 
across the population.  For example, the premium paid by the residents of tony Fifth 
Avenue to look out on Central Park, represents the valuation placed on park views by an 
extremely rich swath of the population.  This valuation might be considerably higher than 
the valuation that a poor person might place on park views.  There are no perfect 
solutions to this problem and it means that all hedonic estimates need to be thoughtfully 
interpreted.   
 
The second problem with hedonic estimates is that they require us to hold everything else 
constant.  Even the simplest models emphasize the difficulty of doing that.  An attractive 
amenity will attract the people who are willing to pay the most for it.  If those people are 
rich, and if people like living around rich people, then the first natural amenity will be 
correlated with the second amenity of living around richer people.  A second example is 
that when comparing across jurisdictions, we have scores of differences in tax levels, 
public service provision and regulation that can all potentially impact the desire to live in 
an area.  In principle, we can try to control for a rich array of area characteristics, but we 
may often doubt our ability to measure such things perfectly.  As a result, hedonic 
estimates are almost always compromised of correlations between the observed 
neighborhood attributes and the error term in the regression.   
 
This potential bias has generally led researchers away from metropolitan area level 
analysis, such as the correlation between weather and prices at the area level, to a lower 14 
 
level of analysis where we can be more confident that neighborhoods are comparable, 
except for the variable in question.  For example, older studies looking at the impact of 
school quality on housing prices had compared across school districts.  These districts are 
usually coterminous with other governmental boundaries so it is hard to ensure that any 
observed effects reflect only schools.  Moreover, high human capital people sort into area 
with better schools, so it is hard to know whether a correlation between schools and 
property values reflects the schools themselves or the people attracted by the schools.   
 
In response to these problems, Black (1999) turned to using attendance districts.  
Attendance districts operate within jurisdictions and determine which of the lower 
schools that the children in a particular house will attend.  People within the same school 
district who are in different attendance districts pay the same taxes and receive all of the 
same other government services.  Black addressed the omitted neighborhood 
characteristic problem by comparing smaller and smaller geographic units, until she was 
literally comparing houses on opposite sides of the same street, which just happen to be 
associated with different lower schools.  Black’s estimates still find a significant 
willingness to pay for better schools, but the estimates are also much lower than those 
found in the earlier area level studies.   
 
III.  Agglomeration Economies and Housing Supply  
 
In the previous section, I discussed the equalizing difference implications of the need for 
individuals to be in a spatial equilibrium.   The spatial equilibrium framework focuses on 
individual location choice and the implication that bad things in a location, like high 
housing prices, are offset by good things in a location, like high wages.  This indifference 
condition delivers only one side of the labor market and one side of the housing market.  
In the labor market, these individual choices deliver labor supply but do not give us labor 
demand.  In the housing market, these individual choices deliver housing demand but not 
housing supply.  To understand fully the distribution of people, prices and wages across 
space, we must also turn to the decisions of employers and builders or the determinants of 
labor demand and housing supply.   15 
 
The usual purpose of economic models is to explain differences in endogenous variables, 
like prices and quantities, with exogenous variables, like geography or long-standing 
historical conditions.  Since the spatial indifference condition of workers gives us little 
idea about where differences in wages or housing prices might come from, we need to 
bring in labor demand and housing supply to give us a chance of linking prices, wages 
and population with exogenous factors.   
 
The Location of Firms and Labor Demand 
 
In the previous section, we argued that a spatial equilibrium required that people be 
indifferent across space.  A similar condition applies to firms. If we see firms operating in 
a particular locale, economists infer that the firm could not earn greater profits by moving 
somewhere else.  As usual, economists think of this condition holding only 
approximately.  Obviously, there are many factors, from moving costs to the spatial 
preferences of the CEO, that might mean that firms don’t perfectly profit maximize when 
they choose locations.  While economists’ accept these caveats, the no-arbitrage 
equilibrium assumption still seems like the best available tool for understanding spatial 
decisions.  This assumption pushes us towards the view that where firms face higher 
costs, then there must be something else that is good for those firms.  Otherwise, they 
would leave.  
 
High wages are perhaps the most obvious locational attribute which is bad from a firm’s 
point of view.  To workers, high wages are an attraction.  To firms, high wages (holding 
worker quality constant) are a negative since high wages mean high costs.  The logic of 
the spatial equilibrium suggests that there must be something good about high wage 
areas, from a firm’s perspective, which offsets the high cost of doing business.  The most 
natural explanation is that high wage regions are also areas that are more economically 
productive.    
 
Labor economists would come to the same conclusion—high wages imply high 
productivity—as urban economists, but they might arrive through a slightly different 16 
 
route.  In a competitive labor market, economic theory suggests that firms should keep on 
hiring workers until the cost of an extra worker, i.e. the wage, is equal to the marginal 
benefit of that worker, i.e. the increase in total profits generated by that work.  If final 
goods prices are constant across space, then this condition suggests that wages are, at 
least approximately, equal to the marginal product of labor.  This reasoning suggests that 
wages are almost a direct measure of the marginal revenue product of labor in a given 
place. 
 
Why are some places productive enough that firms are willing to pay substantially higher 
wages to locate there?  Perhaps the simplest explanation is that a given place has some 
sort of innate geographic advantage, such as access to a valuable natural resource like a 
coal mine or a deep sea port.  We should not be surprised that wages seem to have been 
high in nineteenth century Chicago, since that city had an unparalleled position as the hub 
of America’s inland water network.  Today, workers in Alaska earn high wages.  From 
the worker’s angle, these high wages compensate individuals for the discomfort of the 
cold.   From the firm’s angle, these high wages are compensated for by the natural-
resource based Alaskan productivity.   
 
While some locational advantages are innate, many more are man-made.  A long tradition 
in urban economics, going back to von Thunen, emphasizes the advantages of proximity 
to customers and suppliers.  If a firm is closer to its suppliers, then it is more productive 
because it can save on the shipping costs of its inputs.  If a firm is closer to its customers, 
then it is more productive because it can save on the shipping costs of its final goods.  
The desire to save on these transport costs explains why great industrial cities grew up 
around America’s early ports:  an initial concentration of activity attracted firms that 
wanted to sell to the first residents and take advantage of the area’s transport network.  
The ability to save on transport costs makes firms more productive and can offset the 
costs associated with higher wages.   
 
Of course, throughout much of the 20
th century, transport costs for goods have declined.  
Glaeser and Kohlhase (2004) document a roughly 90 percent reduction in the real cost of 17 
 
moving a ton a mile by rail.  This remarkable decrease becomes even more striking when 
we consider the general growth of the economy and the introduction of newer transport 
technologies like trucks and airplanes.  The result of this decline is that erstwhile 
locational advantages associated with reduction in the cost of shipping goods have 
become far less important.  The decline of cities that were built around the waterways of 
the Midwest was a natural consequence of the decreased importance of the costs of 
shipping goods.  A second consequence of the decline in transport costs is that wages in 
areas that had a transportation advantage have fallen relative to the rest of the country.   
 
While locational advantages associated with reductions in the cost of shipping goods are 
less important today than in the past, wage and productivity differences across space are 
as large as ever.  The economic interpretation of that fact is that other forces must 
continue to make some places more productive than others.   While transport costs for 
goods have dropped dramatically, the costs of moving people have not declined so 
steadily.  Since time is the major input in the cost of moving people, and the value of time 
rises roughly with the wage rate, the cost of moving people remains high.  As a result, 
many cities increasingly specialize in services that require face-to-face interactions.   
 
The highest wage metropolitan areas tend today to specialize not in manufacturing, but in 
business services.   These industries—including law, finance, consulting, and 
accounting— are more productive in some places than others because they are close to 
customers and each other.  The complementarity between different types of services 
means that the productivity of a lawyer in Manhattan is generally higher than the 
productivity of the same lawyer in rural Montana, because in Manhattan the lawyer is 
physically proximate to potential clients in the financial services industry.   
 
Proximity to people doesn’t just reduce standard transport costs, but it also increases the 
access to the ideas of those people.  A body of research following Alfred Marshall has 
emphasized a connection between local productivity and access to new ideas in particular 
locales.  The great nineteenth century economist Alfred Marshall famously declared that 
in some concentrated locales “the mysteries of the trade become no mystery but are, as it 18 
 
were, in the air.”  Jane Jacobs followed Marshall’s lead in The Economy of Cities and 
emphasized the role that cities have historically played in generating new innovations.  
Jacobs argued that new ideas are formed by combining old ideas and the wealth of 
inspiration within dense urban areas made intellectual cross-fertilization easier.   
 
Economists have become increasingly sympathetic to the view that cities serve as forges 
of human capital and incubators of innovation (Duranton and Puga, 2001).   This view 
has been fused with the idea of human capital spillovers: location-specific productivity 
depends on the density of well educated smart people, since those people produce more 
ideas.  One line of evidence in this area examines the determinants of wages within an 
urban area.   Rauch (1993) showed that holding individual human capital constant, wages 
rise in high human capital areas.  Figure 6 shows the relationship between the average 
income residual, i.e. income holding individual schooling and experience constant, and 
the share of the population in a metropolitan area with college degrees.  People who live 
in more educated areas earn more, which may reflect higher productivity in those areas 
due to a faster exchange of ideas.   
 
A second line of evidence on knowledge-based sources of local productivity has looked 
at patterns of urban growth.  One fact that makes it seem that local knowledge is 
increasingly important for local productivity is the robust connection between initial 
human capital in an area and later growth.  Local skills are among the best predictors of 
which metropolitan areas will succeed, especially in the older regions of this country.  
Figure 7 shows the correlation between the share of the population with bachelor’s 
degrees in 1980 and the growth of the metropolitan area since then.  This type of indirect 
evidence has pushed economists towards the view that locational productivity differences 
may owe something to the benefits that smart people gain from interacting with and 






Housing Supply  
 
The last major ingredient in the economic model of cities is housing supply.  Economists 
are not so oblivious to the real world that they ignore the role of the built environment in 
the development of cities.  Indeed, the percentage change in the number of people in a 
city is almost exactly the same thing as the percentage change in the number of homes in 
that city.  Figure 8 shows this correlation across metropolitan areas in the U.S. between 
1980 and 2000.  If the number of homes is so tightly correlated with the overall growth of 
the area, then it is surely critical to understand the factors determining the growth in the 
number of homes in an area, which itself reflect the supply of housing.   
 
Again, economists understand housing supply with the same no arbitrage tools that are 
used to understand the determination of wages and employment in the labor market.  The 
key no arbitrage condition in the housing market is that housing prices must not be higher 
than the total cost of supplying new housing.  If a builder can sell a home for more than it 
costs to build a home, then the logic of economics strongly suggests that a new home will 
be built.  This logic implies that developers will keep on building to the point where the 
total costs of building a new unit are equal to housing costs.   
 
Again, this condition is only meant to hold approximately.  There are some market 
imperfections in the construction industry, although monopoly is likely to be rare since 
the number of builders in most metropolitan areas is quite large.  Construction takes time, 
especially in the permitting process, and this means that builders are guessing the 
eventual sales price when they are initiating the permitting process.  With these caveats, 
economists have still relied on the equilibrium condition that housing prices should be 
close to the total costs of building.     
 
If every area had the same basic supply of housing, so that costs of production were more 
or less identical, then it would be perfectly reasonable to focus on factors other than 
housing supply.  However, there is abundant evidence suggesting that housing supply 
differs from place to place.  If there was one single housing supply for every place, then 20 
 
we would expect to see high price in high construction areas and low prices in low 
construction areas.   
 
Figure 9 shows the correlation between prices in 2005 and the number of new permits in 
a metropolitan area between 2000 and 2005.   The figure shows that the expensive places 
in the U.S. have low development and the places in the U.S. with abundant development 
have low prices.  This fact is not compatible with the view that places differ only in their 
level of housing demand.  In that case, high price places would also have more 
development.  Only differences in the supply of housing can explain why San Francisco 
has high prices and low permitting while Houston has high permitting and low prices.   
 
Some of the differences in supply conditions reflect the actual physical costs of 
construction.  Gyourko and Saiz (2006) estimate that one-fifth of the variation in housing 
prices across space can be attributed to differences in the cost of building homes.  
Materials, and especially labor, do cost more in some places than in others.  Some part of 
the difference in housing supply also reflects physical conditions, like lack of land and 
natural barriers to development such as too much or too little water . 
 
In my work in this area with Joseph Gyourko and others, I have argued that land use 
regulations, not construction costs or land density, explain the bulk of the differences in 
housing supply across space.  This claim is based on both direct evidence linking land use 
controls with less construction and higher prices (Glaeser and Ward, 2006, Katz and 
Rosen, 1987) but also indirect evidence of many forms.  For example, new construction 
per acre is more common in areas with higher density, not in areas with less land.  
Housing prices in Manhattan are far higher than the cost of supplying a new unit by 
building an extra floor on a new skyscraper.  The discrepancy between price and cost 
seems to imply regulatory barriers on new construction.  If this hypothesis is correct and 
differences in housing supply reflect differences in regulatory regimes, then these 
regulatory regimes are having a major impact on both the cost of living and urban 
growth.   
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Economics predicts that housing prices should not be higher than the costs of new 
building, but it does not predict any floor on housing prices.  Housing prices can certainly 
fall below construction costs, but if they do, economics predicts that no new housing will 
be built.  This scenario describes many of the inner cities of the rustbelt that have housing 
prices that are far below construction costs and almost no new construction (Glaeser and 
Gyourko, 2005).  The durability of housing means that these places remain, despite the 
fact that their productivity and amenity levels are not high enough to justify housing costs 
that would cover the costs of construction.  In these places, we expect to see continuing 
urban decline, because current low prices suggest that there is not nearly enough demand 
to prod the market into building new homes.   
 
One implication of the abundant durable housing in declining cities is that attempts to 
revitalize these cities with new construction seem particularly odd.  These declining cities 
have abundant housing and physical infrastructure relative to demand.  That is why prices 
are so low.  How could it make sense to respond to those conditions by building more 
infrastructure?   
 
IV.  The Empirical Approach of Economics to Cities 
 
Disciplines are divided not only by core theoretical assumptions, but by their empirical 
methods.   Over the past 50 years, economics has particularly distinguished itself by a 
focus on statistical work with large data sets, as opposed to case studies.  Over the past 15 
years, empirical economists have become particularly focused on causal inference.   The 
strength of empirical economics is in quantitative empirical methods, especially 
sophisticated methods that are focused on exogenous sources of variation.  By contrast, 
only a few economists have real expertise in non-quantitative forms of research, like 
ethnography.  
 
The early classics of urban social science, none of which were written by economists, 
generally combine statistical work and descriptive observation.  For example, the 
greatness of DuBois’ Philadelphia Negro comes from its fusion of statistics and first 22 
 
hand knowledge of the community.   Over the next century, urban sociologists such as 
those in the “Chicago School” captured the rich details of urban life by developing tools 
of ethnographic research.   Ethnographic classics, like Gans’ The Urban Villagers or 
Liebow’s Talley’s Corner, presents rich depictions of particular neighborhoods. 
 
Even the more statistical exercises in urban sociology and urban political science are 
often distinguished by their ability to capture more detailed information on particular 
areas.  For example, over the course of the 20
th century, sociological survey research 
became increasingly sophisticated about asking detailed questions about urban life.  More 
recently, the work of Sampson, Raudenbusch and Earl (1997) use movie cameras and 
other technologies to acquire visual images of particular places that were then 
transformed into statistical measures of neighborhood activity that went far beyond the 
usual administrative data.   
 
Economists have rarely been so willing to invest in getting richer depictions of any 
particular neighborhood.   Since economists tend to be interested more in common 
patterns than in unique features of particular locales, few economists have tried to 
comprehensively measure any particular place.  Moreover, since economists came late to 
the study of cities, there was little incentive to try to compete with sociologists in an area 
where that discipline is particularly strong.  Finally, economists have a particular interest 
in financial variables like income and housing prices that do tend to be administratively 
available.   
 
While economists have not contributed much to either ethnography or rich environmental 
measurement, economists have focused particularly on causal inference and exogenous 
variation.  This focus comes from the strong attachment to formal economic theory.  
Economic models are generally geared towards predicting the relationship between an 
exogenous variable and endogenous variables, such as the link between an exogenous 
cost shock to an industry and both prices and quantities.  Since our models are geared 
towards links between exogenous variables and outcomes, our theoretical work has also 
come to focus on exogeneity.   23 
 
 
This theoretical background does not preclude interest in the correlation between two 
endogenous variables.  For example, the relationship between income and housing prices 
shown in Figure 3 is certainly relevant to urban economics.  However, the lack of 
exogenous variation in that figure makes it inherently unsatisfying to many economists.  
The link shown in the figure might mean that some places are intrinsically more 
productive than others and therefore have high wages which then cause high prices.  
Alternatively, the picture might mean that some places are intrinsically more expensive 
than others and those high prices then ensure the need to pay high wages.  As discussed 
in the previous section a whole theoretical apparatus that embeds endogenous housing 
supply is needed to truly make sense of this correlation.   
 
For an economist, making sense of Figure 3 requires a source of exogenous variation in 
the productivity of different regions.  That exogenous variation would then enable us to 
trace out the impact that higher productivity has on wages and prices and housing supply.  
Unfortunately, such exogenous sources of variation are often difficult to come by.  One 
approach has been to look at the changes over time in the international price of 
commodities produced by a particular locale and then to look at how wages, prices and 
construction change with respect to that price.  A particularly clear example is the price 
of oil which strongly influences prices, construction and wages in Texas.  Since the price 
of oil is determined by factors largely outside of the Texas economy, this provides us 
with one source of exogenous variation that can be used to examine the link between 
income and prices.   
 
Over the past 15 years, economists have made much progress on using the tools of casual 
inference to examine urban issues. For example, Hoxby (2000) used the number of rivers 
across metropolitan areas to provide exogenous variation in the number of natural 
barriers which then predicts the number of governments in an area.  Using this natural 
source of variation, Hoxby finds that more inter-governmental competition increases 
school performance.    
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No one has been more successful in identifying exogenous sources of variation than 
Steve Levitt, whose popular book Freakonomics, made his work world famous.  Levitt’s 
work often relies on exogenous events, like ACLU lawsuits against prisons, to identify 
important economic relationships, such as the impact of incarcerating criminals on crime 
and urban growth (Levitt, 1996, Berry-Cullen and Levitt, 1999).  Without such sources of 
exogenous variation, economists would find it difficult to say anything meaningful about 
the relationship between incarceration and crime, since incarceration rates are themselves 
a function of the amount of crime in an area.   
 
One approach to causal inference has been to use spatial discontinuities in public policy. 
Since policies change discontinuously at a border, it is possible to identify the impact of 
policy separately from other forces if those other forces are assumed to change more 
continuously.  The work of Sandra Black on housing prices and school districts discussed 
above is one use of spatial discontinuities in economic policy.  Holmes (1998) used these 
discontinuities to look at the impact of employment policies, like right-to-work laws on 
firm locations.  While this approach produces something of a natural experiment 
associated with a somewhat random change in public policy at a border, it faces 
difficulties in identifying the impact of a particular policy if many policies 
simultaneously change at a border.   
 
A final natural extension of the economic focus on causal inference has been an 
increasing interest in designing new policy experiments.  Perhaps the most famous of 
these experiments is the Moving-to-Opportunity program funded by the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development.  In this experiment, subjects that lived in high poverty 
areas were randomly allocated into three groups.  One group was the control and received 
no assistance.  A second group received a standard Section 8 rental voucher.  The third 
group received a special voucher that committed the program to pay for housing if the 
recipient moved to a low poverty neighborhood.   The recipients in the two treated groups 
both used their vouchers to move to areas with less poverty and less crime (Katz, Kling 
and Liebman, 2001).  
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This experiment was particularly exciting to economists because it seemed to offer the 
hope of identifying the impact of neighborhood choice on outcomes for children and 
adults.  The basic correlation between poverty and growing up in poor neighborhoods 
seemed to suggest the presence of neighborhood effects, where children in those 
neighborhoods have unfortunate outcomes because of a lack of economic opportunity, 
role models or good schools.  However, it was always possible that these correlations 
reflected the fact that parents in these neighborhoods were intrinsically different in some 
hard-to-measure way from parents in more affluent neighborhoods.  The Moving-To-
Opportunity experiment gave us the opportunity to compare parents who differed only on 
the basis of their receiving this voucher.   
 
The basic findings of this experiment have suggested that neighborhood effects were 
probably over-rated.  Parents who received the vouchers do seem to have become 
happier, but their economic success did not increase.  Female children of voucher 
recipients did become somewhat more successful, but male children fared worse.  The 
studies that came out of the Moving to Opportunity program have used exogenous 
variation to challenge prevailing wisdom that came from ecological correlations.  These 
findings show that economists’ use of exogenous variation can produce very different 
results than results using raw correlations.  
 
The attention to causal inference is one empirical by-product of economists’ focus on 
formal theory.  Another by-product is the use of data to estimate formal models.  For 
example, Ellison and Glaeser (1997) provide a formal model of firm location choice that 
then creates a natural index of geographic concentration of industry.  Rosenthal and 
Strange (2001) use this index to understand the roots of agglomeration economies.  
Indeed, a common view in economics is that researchers should be able to justify any 






V.  Economics and Urban Policy 
 
The economic approach to urban policy combines the use of cost-benefit analysis and the 
assumption that the goal of policy is to increase the choices available to people.   The 
most important part of this assumption is that people, not places, are the important 
outcomes.  A policy that yields a beautiful place, but does little to increase the welfare of 
individuals has little appeal to most economists.  Policies make sense to economists if 
their benefits to people outweigh their costs.  This may not distinguish economists from 
sociologists, but it does distinguish economists from some architecturally oriented urban 
planners and from place-based politicians.   
 
The economists’ desire to put people first might seem obvious, but it is often in conflict 
with much place-based urban policy.   For example, regional policies in Europe, such as 
the European Union’s spending on infrastructure for poorer areas like the Mezzogiorno 
and in the U.S., such as the Appalachian Regional Commission, are classic place-based 
policies that aim to make particular regions wealthier.  In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, 
many advocates for New Orleans called for hundreds of billions of dollars to be spent so 
that the city would come back.   
 
The economics approach to public policy pushes us to ask whether this money would be 
better spent on people, rather than place based policies.  For example, would 500,000 
residents of New Orleans be better off with 200,000 dollars apiece or 100 billion dollars 
worth of government infrastructure.  While it seems hard to argue that infrastructure 
spending was the best thing for the people of New Orleans, economics does not give us a 
universal rule against place-based spending.  People’s lives are certainly enriched when 
they live in a successful place and there surely are times when the best way to help 
people is to improve a place. 
 
For example, late nineteenth century investments in water systems were placed-based 
policies.  Massive public works projects, like the Croton Aquaduct, delivered clean water 
to residents of a particular locale.  Clean water was critical for avoiding public health 27 
 
disasters like Cholera epidemics and it is hard to argue that these place-based investments 
didn’t deliver benefits that exceeded costs.  Crime prevention is also generally handled 
place-by-place and investments in place-based policing also often seem to deliver 
benefits that outweigh costs.   
 
However, there are other cases where place based systems do not seem so sensible.  First 
of all, the beneficiaries of much place-based spending are often local landowners rather 
than current residents.  For example, building a fancy contemporary art museum in a poor 
neighborhood that is short on contemporary art aficionados may well increase housing 
prices because of rich professionals who are willing to pay more for proximity to the 
museum.  However, if the original residents don’t care about the art then they will be 
made worse off because they need to pay more for their housing and haven’t gained 
something that they particularly value.   
 
A second issue with place-based policies is that they artificially distort migration 
decisions.  One can easily argue that the best thing that can happen to the residents of a 
declining region is that they leave that region and move to areas with a brighter economic 
future.  If place-based policies reduce the incentive to migrate, then they may reduce the 
beneficial process of moving from less productive areas to more productive areas.  This 
argument is akin to arguments that economists make against propping up declining 
industries.  Economic efficiency requires workers to move to more productive industries 
or places.  Economic policy that tries to stop that process is reducing efficiency. 
 
The third issue with place based policies is that these policies have often provided 
excuses for vast expenditures which benefit contractors more than target populations.  
Since amorphous appeals to the magic of a particular place are not amenable to 
conventional cost-benefit analysis, this means that all sorts of projects can be justified 
that do not provide people with benefits that are large enough to justify their costs.  For 
example, much of the urban renewal spending in the 1960s was seen as being a way of 
rebuilding cities, but few people actually bothered to ask whether this spending would 
deliver people benefits large enough to offset costs.   28 
 
Economics and Laissez-Faire 
 
Some of the most famous results in formal economic theory suggest that competitive 
markets will deliver a socially desirable outcome in the absence of market failures.  Of 
course, even these results do not claim that free markets equitably redistribute income.  
Moreover, market failures often appear endemic in urban settings.  One example of 
market failures are externalities, which are defined as settings where one person’s action 
impacts his neighbors in ways that are not mediated by the price system.  A classic 
example is the production of pollution.  A second example of a market failure is the 
existence of public goods, like the legal system, that are non-rival and non-excludable.  
The close connection of people in cities generally increases the level of externalities and 
the scope for government intervention.   
 
The problems of externalities like pollution, the spread of disease and congestion mean 
that pure laissez-faire is rarely an option in urban economics.  Few economists question 
the wisdom of disease-reducing expenditures on clean water or the need for local police.  
Moreover, the existence of agglomeration economies in cities makes it at least possible 
that economic externalities exist that could, in principle, justify significant government 
interventions in local economies.  
 
Yet despite abundant externalities, economists remain more skeptical of many forms of 
government intervention than representatives of many other disciplines.  This skepticism 
is based not on an uncritical faith in the free market but rather in doubts about the 
competence and benevolence of government.  Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, 
which is the closest thing economics has to a founding document, was the product of the 
Scottish Enlightenment.  Like many thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, Smith 
questioned the tendency of kings to perfectly care for their subject’s interests.  While 
there is little doubt that democracy has generally made governments more benign, 
economists have retained doubts about the perfection of government.  As such, those 
economists who have a predilection for limited government base that view not on an 29 
 
unquestioning faith in the market, but rather on doubts about the perfect benevolence of 
the state.   
 
In the context of cities, doubts about governmental goodness and competence certainly 
have some basis in fact.  Corruption was endemic in many American cities throughout 
much of the 19
th century.  Urban leadership has often been beholden to special interests 
on both the left and the right.  Moreover, the limited resources available to local 
governments often ensures that even well intentioned city governments have difficulties 
figuring out the right course of action.   
 
Skepticism about the limits of government is particularly important in debates about 
activist economic policy.  On one side of this debate, pro-intervention advisors urge using 
government intervention to secure the growth of industries that will generate positive 
externalities for other people and firms in the city.  Anti-intervention advisors doubt the 
ability of the government to get this right.  Beason and Weinstein (1996) show that 
Japan’s famous Ministry of International Trade and Industry was not good at directing 
funds to firms that were either ex post successful or ex ante likely to have a high return.  
The track records of city governments, which have often targeted elderly industries with 
little chance for growth, are hardly encouraging.   
 
The opponents of firm-level targeting argue that the best economic development plan is 
to attract smart people and get out of their way.  Within this group, there is some division 
on what attracts smart people.  Some authors, like Richard Florida, emphasize hip 
downtowns.  Others emphasize good schools, safe streets and fast commutes.  While all 
of these debates are currently active, there is no sense that economists have come to any 
discipline-wide agreement on these issues.   
 
City Limits and Migration 
 
Urban economists are less divided on the view that good urban policy must reflect the 
fact that people and firms are mobile.  Location choice lies at the heart of urban 30 
 
economics, so it is unsurprising that urban economists have been particularly attuned to 
the connection between government policy and location choice.  The seminal paper in 
local public finance is Tiebout (1956), which argued that many different localities would 
provide consumers with a variety of choices about the kind of public services that they 
would like to consume.  Just as economists think that competition among firms ensures 
that consumers will have a rich set of choices about product choices, competition across 
governments seems to allow consumers to vote with their feet and choose the government 
that best fits their needs.   
 
Tiebout mentions, but does not emphasize, a second potential benefit from competition 
among government: improving the incentives facing governments.  Since economists 
tend to doubt the innate benevolence of the public sector, there may be benefits from 
forcing governments to compete to attract people and firms.  Just as private sector 
monopolies don’t serve consumers well, public sector monopolies can be just as 
problematic.  Hoxby (2000) is a classic paper on the connection between inter-
governmental competition and better school provision.   
 
Economists’ emphasis on the mobility of people and firms guides policy 
recommendations at both the local and national level.  At the local level, the mobility of 
factors means that policy makers face strong limits in the extent that they can pursue 
redistribution policies.  Raising taxes on the rich to fund the poor may be socially 
attractive, but at the urban level such redistribution seems to lead to a quick flight of the 
rich.  The classic statement of this point is Paul Peterson’s City Limits.  Peterson is a 
political scientist, although one who was strongly influenced by economics and especially 
Tiebout.  One hypothesis is that an increasing recognition of the mobility of wealth 
explains why socially visionary mayors of the 1960s, like John Lindsay, have been 
replaced by mayors who look more like city managers, like Richard M..Daley (Glaeser 
and Kahn, 1999).   
 
The mobility of the rich suggests both that mayors should avoid repelling the well-to-do, 
but also that they might want to pursue policies that will attract high human capital 31 
 
residents.  The robust correlation between urban success and a skilled population 
suggests that attracting skilled people might be a particularly sensible policy for a mayor 
who is trying to generate long run economic success for his area.  Of course, there is less 
consensus about what things will attract a skilled population to a city.   
 
At the national level, the emphasis on the mobility of people and firms often leads 
economists to favor spatial neutrality.  Many economists think that the government 
should not interfere in the competition between firms, each of which is trying to 
maximize their own profits.  Analogously, many economists think that it makes sense for 
the national government to restrain from interfering in the competition between cities, 
each of which is trying to attract people and firms.  Policies that favor particular cities 
will dilute the incentives to compete and create spatial distortions that artificially push 
people to one place or another.  There is no conflict between economists advising mayors 
on how to build up their cities while simultaneously advising the national government to 
stay neutral, any more than there is a conflict between economists advising individual 
firms and simultaneously opposing government intervention in the marketplace.   
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
Urban economics is only one of the many disciplines that contribute to our understanding 
of cities.  Among the social sciences, the economic approach to cities is distinguished by 
its strong ties to formal economic theory based on the concept of a no-arbitrage 
equilibrium.  Economists seek to understand cities with a framework that requires people 
to be indifferent over space, employers to be indifferent over where to locate and how 
many people to hire and builders to be indifferent about whether or not to build more or 
taller buildings.  This attachment to theory provides urban economics with discipline and 
with a clear structure.  Almost everything urban economists do can be understood as part 
of the large question of understanding why people choose to locate in urban areas.   
 
While the economic approach to cities has many strengths, the economic approach also 
has profound limitations.  Economists have never acquired the skills to study the built 32 
 
environment or the intricacies of individual neighborhoods.  Our overwhelming focus on 
quantitative methods has left us poorly suited to treat historical narratives in a scientific 
fashion.  While I believe that no one can make sense of cities without the tools of 
economics, I also believe that no economist can make sense of cities without borrowing 
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Fig. 1: 2000 Housing Value on Distance to Boston
Distance to Boston








































































































































































Fig. 2: Log Population Density on Distance to Boston
Distance to Boston



























































































































































































Fig. 3: Housing Value on Median Income Across MSAs - 2000
Median Income 2000
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Fig. 4: Real Income on January Temperature Across MSAs - 2000
January Temperature
























































































































































































Fig. 5: Transportation Time on Median Income Across Cities - 2000
Income (Thousands of Dollars)





















































































































































































































Fig. 6: Average Income Residual and % Pop. w/ Bach. Degree - 2000
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Fig. 7: 1980-2000 Population Growth and % Bach. Degree
% Pop. w/ Bach. Degree - 1980
 dpop8000  Fitted values




































































































Fig. 8: Change in Housing Units and Population 1980-2000
Change in Population 1980-2000
 Change in Housing Units 1980-20  Fitted values


























Permits 2000-5/Stock in 2000







































































































Fig. 9: Correlation Between 2005 Housing Prices and New Permits 2000-2005 